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MADHAV DESHPANDE 
S ENTENCE-COGNITION IN NY,~YA EPISTEMOLOGY 
According to the Naiy~yikas, the logicians of the Ny~ya school of Indian philosophy, 
there are four kinds of  valid cognition, i.e. sense-perception (pratyaks.a), inference 
(anurr~na), comparison (upam~na) and verbal cognition (gabda-ja~na). Linguistic 
utterances (gabda) are the means of  verbal cognition, and only valid linguistic 
utterances can lead to valid verbal cognitions. For this reason, assessment of validity 
of  linguistic utterances has become an essential part of  most of the Indian philo- 
sophical systems. The concept of validity as it pertains to linguistic utterances, or 
rather to sentences, is a complex concept and it involves different kinds of problems. 
The validity of a linguistic utterance may be viewed from the point of view of the 
linguistic structure of  that utterance as well as from the point of view of the truth 
value of the cognition generated by that utterance. In this paper, I have dealt with 
some aspects of this question. The first part of this paper deals with some general 
questions, while the second part deals specifically with certain arguments of 
Jagadiffa Bhat.tfic~rya, a medieval logician of great repute. These arguments are 
offered to establish that knowledge derived from linguistic utterances is a type of 
knowledge distinct from sense-perception, inference and comparison. 
The notion of verbal cognition is more closely related to the notion of sentence- 
meaning than to the meaning of isolated lexical or morphemic items. ~ Therefore, 
we shall briefly survey different conceptions of 'sentence' offered by Indian philo- 
sophical systems, and then turn to the critical examination of the Ny~ya conception. 
2. 
The Sanskrit grammarians offer the following definitions: 
(A) eka-tih v~kyarrL 2 
The literal translation of  this definition runs as: "A sentence is a single inflected 
verb-form". The extended definition means: "A sentence is a group of words which 
has a single inflected verb-form (as its center)". A further extension of this definition 
is: (eka-tih-mukhya-viges.yakain v~kyam): "A sentence is a group of words which 
(centers around) only one principal verb-form". 3 
(B) ~khy~ta& sffvyaya-k&aka-vi~es.a.narh va-kyam.4 
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Literal translation: "A sentence is a group of words which contains a verb-form 
along with (related) action-promoters (karakas, agent, object etc.), indeclinables 
and qualifiers". 
(C) akhy~tain savffe.sa.nain v~kya~ s 
Translation: "A sentence is a group of words which contains a verb-form along 
with its qualifiers". This definition presents a simplified logical structure of  a 
sentence as a group of words wherein the verb is the focus and all other words in 
a sentence are viewed as somehow specifying, qualifying and particularizing the 
semantic content of the verb-form. 
Bhartrhari has provided a number of  other hypothetical definitions, 6 but the 
final emphasis of  Bhart.rhari is on the concept of  indivisibility of the sentence and 
its meaning. He says that both are indivisible in 'reality', and that all the analytical 
divisions and isolated forms in grammar are but functional fictions. 7 For him, the 
cognition of sentence-meaning is an instantaneous flash, with no real internal 
structure, a , Other schools in Indian philosophy have not accepted this radical doctrine. 
The system of M~m~rhs~ defines a sentence as: 
(D) arthaikatv~l ekain v~kyam. 9 
"A sentence is a group of  words, such that it signifies a single self-contained idea". 
A definition such as this focuses on the purpose of a sentence rather than on its 
structure. The M~m~riasakas are mainly concerned with ritual injunctions in the 
Vedic texts, and like to interpret each injunction as laying down a particular aspect 
of  the ritual. Thus their definition is not strictly a definition of  a grammatical 
notion of a sentence. 
3. 
Let us now turn to the Ny~ya conception of a sentence. Some peculiar aspects of this 
conception, particularly as it was developed by the later Naiy~yikas, must be clearly 
understood. A sequence such as rgma.h ghat.arh nayati 'Rama carries a jar' is a v~kya 
'sentence' for these logicians, but the mere accusative form gha.tam 'a jar' is also 
sometimes referred to as a sentence (vffkya). 1~ We must analyse the Ny~ya concep- 
tion of a sentence keeping in mind this peculiarity. 
The Ny~ya system defines ~akt/ 'power' or signification function of a word as the 
desire of  God or of  a community that a certain word should signify a certain mean- 
ing.H A pada 'word' is defined as a (minimal) sound sequence which possesses 
~akti 'significatory power', or signification function.12 This category includes all 
stems, roots and affixes, or to use a modern term, all morphemic elements, without 
regard to the morpheme-allomorph distinction. This is the notion of the neo- 
logicians like Jagadfga. 
SENTENCE-COGNITION IN NY~,YA EPISTEMOLOGY 197 
The early Nyffya exhibits a different conception. The Ny~a-s~tra of Gotama 
and the Nyaya-bhRs.ya of  V~tsyffyana define a pada as a word that ends in either a 
t'mite verb inflection or a case-ending. 13 This conception is identical with Pff .nini's 
definitions. ~4 The later Nyffya d&mition ofpada shifts from an inflected word to 
a morphemic item. 
4. 
With this definition of a pada 'word' as a morphemic item, the later logicians define 
a v~ya 'sentence' as follows: ~s 
A sentence is a group of words, such that these words fulfil the conditions of a) mutual expec- 
tancy (~kdhk#), b) semantic or empirical compatibility (yogyat~), and c) contiguity (sannidhl). 
Before discussing any details of  this definition, it must be pointed out that the 
Ny~ya system is actually dealing with propositional expressions or, to be more 
precise, expressions communicating qualificative cognitions (vi~is.t.a-j~dna). A quali- 
ficative cognition has the content-structure of the type xQy, 'x, qualified by y' .  
Here x is the qualificand (vis'e.sya), and y is the qualifier (vi~es.a.na, prakffra). If there 
are two morphemic elements, say P1 and 1~ such that the meaning of  the sequence 
PIP2 is: 'meaning of PI, qualified by the meaning of P2', then the sequence PIP2 
may be called a v~tkya 'sentence' or a propositional expression. Dominance of a 
certain meaning-item is determined by many different factors.16 
For instance, the accusative singular form ghat.am, which is a full propositional 
expression according to the neo-logicians, can be analysed as follows: 
(1) ghat.am 
(2) ghat.a + am 
(3) ghat.a- = 'jar', -am = accusative sing. = 'object-ness'. 
Let us disregard meanings such as 'singularity' for the moment. The meaning of the 
sequence ghat.am, according to the neo-logicians, has the following structure: 
'Objectness, qualified by a jar' = ghat.a-ni~pita-karmatva. 
The sequence gha.tam fulfills all the conditions in the definition of a sentence. The 
two morphemic items have mutual expectancy, semantic compatibility and contiguity. 
Therefore, the sequence gha.tam is regarded to be a v~kya 'sentence'. 
Smaller propositional expressions can be combined with each other to build 
larger complex propositional expressions. This fits the atomistic metaphysics of 
this school. Fromghat.am 'a jar, the object' and nayati 'x carries', we can build the 
larger sentence: ghat.am nayati '(he) carries the jar'. The structure of the meaning- 
cognition also gets more and more complex. For instance, instead of having a simple 
structure like xQv, 'x, qualified by y ' ,  we find complex structures such as:xQ(yQz). 
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The semantic paraphrase of a sentence such as: 
John brings a jar. 
can be written as: 
agenthood Q (John a (bringing a (objecthood Q jar))) = xQ(ya(za(aQb))) 
This is still a simplified version, and we have to include qualifiers such as 'singularity', 
'present tense' etc. However, the example illustrates the Nyaya conception of the 
structure of sentence-meaning. The Nyaya conception covers sentences in the con- 
ventional sense of the term 'sentence', as well as many other sequences expressing 
propositional qualificative cognitions. 
5. 
With the above clarification concerning the Ny~ya concept of v~kya 'sentence', we 
can closely study some of the other conditions laid down in that definition. The 
first condition is that the components of  a 'sentence' must have mutual expectancy 
(~k~hksa). Annambhat.t.a defines mutual expectancy in the following words: 17 
If a linguistic i tem x cannot  generate an integrated meaning-cognit ion due  to the  absence o f  a 
linguistic i tem y,  then  x is said to have mutua l  expectancy with respect to y. 
This defines interdependence of two linguistic elements. It is not clear, however, 
whether this mutual expectancy is exclusively semantic, syntactic or structural. For 
instance, the accusative singularghat.am 'a jar, the object' has expectancy for a verb 
like nayati 'he carries', and the stem ghat.a- has expectancy for the affrx ~m. But the 
stem ghat.a- has no expectancy for the word karmatva 'objecthood' which expresses 
the meaning of the accusative affix -am. 
6. 
There are some interesting discussions in the Nyffya texts on the concept of mutual 
expectancy. Quoting a view of  kecit 'some logicians', Rffjaca.d~na .nimakhin says: is 
Mutual  expectancy is certainly a particular kind o f  co-occurrence o f  words ending in particular 
terminal  affixes. 
Speaking of the mutual expectancy of the two components, i.e. m-/a 'blue' and 
ghat.a 'jar', in the compound word ntTa-ghat.a 'a blue jar', Gad~dhara says that this 
19 mutual expectancy could be described in structural terms. He says: 
o r  
(1) 
(2) 
The word nF/a immediately precedes the word ghat.a. 
The word ghat.a immediately follows the word nfl~ 
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If in a given compound xy, the elements x and y occur in the specific order xy, 
then the mutual expectancy could be structurally explained in terms of their fixed 
order. Similar structural expectancy may be observed in the stem-affix sequences, 
where the order is fixed. 
It is possible to speak of  a definite word order in the case of  compounds or 
stem-affix sequences, but how could one speak of mutual expectancy as a fixed 
word-order in the case of  Sanskrit sentences? The order of  words may not be fixed, 
and yet Jagadi'ga says: 2~ 
(In the case of the sentence gaur asti 'there is a bull'), the mutual expectancy turns out to be 
a particular order of words which is conducive to bringing out the relation of the meaning- 
element 'existence' to the meaning-element 'bull'. 
Thus the Ny~ya system seems to interpret mutual expectancy more in structural 
terms than in semantic or syntactic terms. It may be described as a particular kind 
of co-occurrence of words. 
7. 
Sanskrit grammarians have dealt with the concept of  mutual expectancy in a more 
significant manner. Patafijali discusses the concept of  vyapek.~ 'meaning-inter- 
dependence' at some length. As S. D. Joshi points out, meaning-interdependence 
implies that two or more word-meanings require each other. 21 Patafijali says: 22 
What do you mean by requirement between two words? 
We do not say: "between two words". 
What then? 
Between two meanings. 
N~gega explains that mutual expectancy is actually a subjective factor, rather than 
a property of  words or meanings. It is in fact the desire or the expectation of the 
listener for the cognition of  meanings which need to complement the meaning of 
a given item. 23 It is of  the form of the question: "what is the meaning which is 
related to this meaning?" It is subjective and lies in the cognitive process of  the 
listener. Expectancy being a cognitive factor cannot be a property of  words or 
meanings. However, since this expectancy is with regard to meanings, it is super- 
imposed on those meanings. Thus in a metaphorical sense we can speak of meanings 
being inter-expectant. But this cognitive expectancy, according to N~gega, can 
never be imposed on words. As he puts it, the cognitive expectancy arises only 
after one cognizes the meanings of  the individual words. The stages of  cognizing 
sentence-meaning are as follows: 
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cognition] 
of words ] =~ 
cognition of [ [ fulfilment of ] 





The conception of  the Sanskrit grammarians is definitely a richer conception. 
8. 
There are some logical problems in the Ny~ya definition of a sentence. Is it required 
that each member of the sentential word-group should have mutual expectancy with 
regard to every other member, or is it enough to have mutual expectancy with some 
member or members of that group? Though the later logicians of this school 
certainly want to make the nominative-word the focus of their syntax, e.g. the 
agent in the active voice and the object in the passive voice, we do not find a clear 
resolution of this issue in the definition of a sentence itself. 
Let us look at the following examples given by Patafijali. 24 
(1) nady~s tis.thati kfde 
of the river, he stands, on the bank 
He stands on the bank of the river. 
(2) gdlinam te odanam daddmi 
of grains, to you, rice, Igive 
Of grains I give you rice. 
In the first example, the word nady~s 'of  the river' is semantically related to the 
word kfde 'on the bank', and not with tis.t.ha~ti 'he stands'. Hence, there is no mutual 
expectancy between nady~s and tis.thati. Similarly, in the second example, there is 
no mutual expectancy between ~lTn~m 'of grains' and te ' to you', since Y~lfnam is 
connected with odanam 'rice' alone. That there is no semantic relation (s~marthya) 
between the first two words in both the sequences is accepted by K~ty[yana and 
Patafijall, but they accept these sequences to be grammatically correct sentences. 2s 
Thus we cannot say that every word in a sentence must be mutually expectant 
of every other word. Can we accept the other alternative, i.e. a member of sentential 
word-group must be mutually expectant with some other member of that word- 
group? This alternative is too vague. The grammarians' definitions of a sentence 
making the verb-form as the center and connecting every other word in the sentence 
directly or indirectly to that verb-form show a clearer perspective of semantic and 
syntactic relationships. While the Nyffya conception of mutual semantic linking is 
based on the concept of a qualificative cognition and appears to be rather linear, the 
grammarians'conception of semantic and syntactic linking appears to be like a wheel 
with the verb at its center and all other items linked to it from different directions. 
Ny~ya Grammarians 
agent Q (action Q object) 
object Q (action Q agent) 
xQ (yQ (aQ (b a(cOd)))) 
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9. 
The second important condition in the Ny~ya definition of a sentence is that of 
yogyat~ 'appropriateness' or 'semantic compatibility'. It is the mutual fitness of  
two or more word-meanings. The main concern of the school of  Ny~ya is not 
grammaticality of  sentences. (In fact these logicians are quite famous for their 
contempt of  grammar and grammarians.) Their main concern is validity or logical 
and empirical acceptability. Therefore, mutual compatibility of  meaning-elements 
is an essential condition for a group of linguistic elements to constitute a logically 
and empirically acceptable propositional expression. The stock-example of lack 
of such mutual compatibility is as follows: 
vahnina si~cati 
He moistens (or sprinkles) with fire. 
According to the Naiy~yikas, in the case of this sequence, there can be a cognition 
of the individual word-meanings, but there is no possibility of  any valid integrated 
sentence-meaning. Mutually incompatible word-meanings cannot be integrated into 
an acceptable sentence-meaning. Hence the school of  Ny~ya does not consider this 
sequence to be a vdkya 'sentence'. 26 
10. 
On the other hand, the Sanskrit grammarians do not accept semantic compatibility 
to be a necessary condition for a group of words to be regarded as a sentence. 
N~gega refutes the view of the logicians that there can be no cognition of any 
sentence-meaning in the case of  the sequence vahnin~ siacati 'He moistens with 
fire'. 27 According to the grammarians, word-meaning is of  the nature of  an 
intellectual mode or a notion, and external verifiability of  the truth-value of a 
sentence is not a necessary condition for the apprehension of sentence-meaning. 
We must distinguish the stage of apprehending the sentence-meaning from the stage 
of evaluating its logical or empirical validity. A given sentence-meaning may be 
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logically or empirically invalid, and yet there is nothing to stop that sentence from 
conveying its meaning. Even when there is no corresponding reality in the external 
world, a word can generate a meaning-cognition. For Sanskrit grammarians, the 
word vandhy~suta 'son of a barren woman' is a perfectly meaningful word. Validity 
of a sentence consists in its lexical and structural soundness, and the Sanskrit 
grammarians wll not care to consider the extra-linguistic truth-value. 
11. 
The difference between the two approaches outlined above is quite significant, and 
is firmly rooted in the fundamentally different professional aims of these two 
schools. The logicians aim at defining a word as a means of valid cognition, and 
hence their definition of a sentence must include only those sequences which lead 
to logically and empirically valid cognitions. Those words or groups of words which 
do not generate valid cognitions cannot be called 'sentences', once the term 'sentence' 
is directly linked with means of valid cognition. I think that this position of the 
logicians is quite valid. However, they almost fall in their own trap and argue that 
one cannot even comprehend sentence-meaning if the word-meanings are mutually 
incompatible. This is indefensible, and the grammarians are quite right in rejecting 
this position. On the other hand, the Sanskrit grammarians are exclusively committed 
to the formal aspects of a sentence. They claim that ultimately it is vivaks.d 'speaker's 
desire' that prompts a speaker to use a particular group of words to express a 
particular meaning, and the science of grammar can judge only the formal features 
of linguistic utterances. The substantive and logical aspects are thought to lie out- 
side the scope of grammar. Therefore, the grammarians' concept of acceptability is 
dependent solely on the formal properties of a sentence. With this background, let 
us look at the famous Chomskian examples: 2s 
(A) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously. 
(B) Furiously sleep idea s green color. 
For the Naiyiyikas, both of these examples would be non-sentential, since neither 
of them leads to a valid cognition. But for the Sanskrit grammarians, the first 
sentence would be a grammatically acceptable sentence, but the second would be 
grammatically unacceptable, since it violates the formal rules of linguistic structure. 29 
However, the Sanskrit grammarians would perhaps most certainly agree that no 
person in his right mind would actually ever use the 'grammatically acceptable' 
sentence: 'Colorless green ideas sleep furiously'. 
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12. 
Before moving to the specific arguments of  Jagadf~a Bha~t.ac~rya,we must briefly 
refer to the well known Nyaya theory of sentence-meaning: abhihitanvayavFrla. 
This theory says that the constituent words of a sentence first express only their 
individual lexical meanings, and then these meanings of  words are combined to 
produce the sentence-meaning. The interrelations of  word-meanings which form a 
part of  the sentence-meaning are not conveyed by the words themselves, but they 
are conveyed by the so-called relational seam (sa~hsarga-maryF~da). a~ This is a signifi- 
cant concept. Individual words in a sentence are said to denote the same meaning 
as is denoted by words in isolation. However, the sentence-meaning is not identical 
with the sum-total of  the word-meanings. In the sentence-meaning, the individual 
word-meanings always appear in an integrated form. As a rule, according to the 
Naiy~yikas, that part of  meaning which is not cognized from the words, but appears 
in the sentence-meaning, is said to be cognized from the juxtaposition of the words, al 
Gadadhara explains that the juxtaposition of  words in a sentence is quite signifi- 
cant, in that this is a major factor giving us the interrelations between different 
lexical and syntactic meanings, a2 This interrelation between different word-meanings 
is promoted by the mutual expectancy between different words, a3 Certain later 
logicians almost identify mutual expectancy with the particular juxtaposition of 
words in a sentence, a4 The value of juxtaposition of  words in communicating supra- 
lexical meanings has been explained recently by Gertrude Wyatt in a similar manner: as 
Sapir has proved that in all known languages, juxtaposition is the simplest, most economical 
method of binding words together and of bringing them into some relation to each other, 
without attempting an inherent modification of these words. The very process os 
concept to concept, symbol to symbol, forces some kind of relational feeling, if nothing else, 
upon us, Words and elements when they are listed in a certain order, tend. not only to establish 
some kind of relation among themselves, but are attracted to each other in greater or in less 
degree. 
No Naiy~yika could have expressed his own conception in more convincing terms. 
DISTINCTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY OF VERBAL COGNITION 
13. 
According to the school of  Navya-Ny~ya, sentential meaning-cognition has to be 
differentiated from other modes of valid cognition. The obvious question is why 
can it not be included in any of  the other modes of valid cognition, notably in 
sense-perception and inference. This is the question that has been discussed by 
Jagadr~a at some length. 
The first alternative considered here is that of  mFmasa-pratyaks.a 'mental 
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perception'. Can verbal cognition be included in mental perception? What is mental 
perception? The school of  Navya.Ny[ya considers mental perception to be a kind 
of sense-perception (pratyak.sa). In every instance of sense-perception, there must be 
a connection (sannikars.a) between the object and the sense-organ. In sense-perception, 
a sense-organ presents information about an object to the mind, and the information 
is acquired through its connection with the outside object. However, in mental 
perception, there is no connection between the object and the sense-organ. Information 
about an object is presented to the mind through some previous cognition, such as 
memory, and the object is said to have been mentally perceived. In such a case 
that previous cognition itself is regarded to be a perceptive connection. The Ny[ya- 
koga says: ~ 
Mental perception is that perception which is caused by both, normal and abnormal perceptive 
connections. For instance, the visual perception 'the sandalwood is fragrant' is a mental 
perception. Concerning the element of fragrance, there is an abnormal perceptive connection. 
But concerning the element of sandal-wood, there is the normal visual perceptive connection. 
The mental perception is produced by both of these perceptive connections. 
The perceiver has a previous cognition of  the fragrance of the sandal-wood, and at 
a later time, when there is a visual perception of sandal-wood again, the element of  
fragrance is brought to the mind through remembrance, and it somehow seems to 
become a part of  the present cognition of  sandal-wood. Here that remembrance, or 
the previous cognition itself is said to serve as a perceptive connection for the 
present cognition. Such a perceptive connection is called cognitive perceptive 
connection (/fi~a-lak.sa.na-pratty~atti = upanaya). 
14. 
If one considers the verbal cognition or the cognition of sentence-meaning to be 
a mental perception as outlined above, what would be the cognitive perceptive 
connection? One may say that the cognition of the individual word-meanings is the 
cognitive perceptive connection that leads to the mental perception of sentence- 
meaning. If that were the case, then, argues the nee-logician, it would be useless to 
state other conditions such as mutual expectancy in the definition of a sentence. He 
argues that if the cognition of sentence-meaning is a mental perception, then the 
individual word-meanings alone should be sufficient to produce this mental 
perception. The only necessary condition for a mental perception is the existence 
of a previous cognition which serves as a cognitive perceptive connection. Hence 
other conditions would have to be ruled out as being superfluous. 
However, every school of  Indian philosophy accepts these basic conditions of 
mutual expectancy etc., and therefore the characterization of the cognition of 
sentence-meaning as a mental perception cannot be accepted. 
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Similarly, one cannot include the cognition of sentence-meaning into the process 
of inference. Every inferential cognition is based on a previous cognition of the 
relation of concommitance between the probans and the probandum. Hence, a 
group of words by themselves cannot explain the cognition of the sentence-meaning 
as an inferential process. One would have to presuppose a previous cognition of 
concommitance of some kind. According to the neo-logicians, there is no cognition 
of concommitance of any kind preceeding the cognition of sentence-meaning. 
15. 
JagadTga Bhat.t.[c~rya points out that the cognition of sentence-meaning is quite 
different from sense-perception, mental perception and inference. 37 He asserts that 
the interrelations between individual lexical and syntactic meanings appear in the 
sentence-meaning, and that its cognition is generated specifically by words with 
mutual expectancy, compatibility and contiguity. In a sequence such as gauh. asti 
'(There) is a bull', there are two individual word-meanings, i.e. 'bull' and 'existence'. 
These meanings are conveyed by the words gau.h and ast/through their 'God-given' 
significatory powers (Yakti). However, in the sentence-meaning, these two word- 
meanings do not appear as just added together, but they appear as interrelated to 
each other. This is the qualifier-qualificand relation (vis'e.sa.na-viges.ya-bh~va). 
According to Jagadfga, the meaning-element 'bull' is the qualificand, and the meaning- 
element 'existence' is its qualifier. Thus the structure of the sentence-meaning is: 
gaur asti = There is a bull. = 'Bull' Q 'Existence' 
The relation between 'bull' and 'existence' is a fixed relation in the sense that we 
cannot accept either 
(A) 'Bull' + 'Existence', or 
(B) 'Existence' Q 'Bull' 
as representing the sentence-meaning of the sequence gaur asti. Jagadfga clearly 
states that the cognition of sentence-meaning is different from a 'mere presentation 
of word-meanings'.3s 
16. 
With this definite idea of the structure of sentence-meaning, the difference between 
sentence-meaning and mental perception or inference is made explicit. 
In a mental perception, if there are two cognita presented to the mind, through 
some previous cognition serving as the cognitive perceptive connection, then those 
two cognita are perceived as only added together, without any particular relation 
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between them being explicitly perceived. According to the neo-logicians, the struc- 
ture of a mental perception o fx  and y cannot be other than 'x + y'.One has no 
way of asserting either the relation xQy, or yQx. 
If one would claim that the cognition of sentence-meaning is a mental perception, 
then the structure of that cognition must be something like 'bull' + 'existence'. 
With the cognition of a sentence-meaning included in mental perception, one cannot 
explain why its structure is 'bull' Q 'existence'. Therefore, the cognition of sentence- 
meaning cannot be a mental perception. 
17. 
In the case of inferential cognition, the situation is exactly opposite. In every 
inferential cognition, there is invariably some relation between the cognita. The 
major term (s~tdhya) and the minor term (paks.a), or the middle term (hetu) and the 
minor term (pak.sa) must have the qualifier-qualificand relation. But the important 
point, according to Jagadfga, is that either of the cognita can become the qualificand, 
and the other becomes the qualifier. Thus, with the same major and minor terms, 
there can be two different inferential states, due to the difference caused by the 
inversion of the qualifier-qualificand relation. For example, the same situation of 
inference can result in: 
(a) parvate vahnih. 
and 
(b) 
= '(There) is fire on the mountain.' 
= 'Fire' Q 'Mountain' 
parvato vahniman = 'The mountain is possessed of fire.' 
= 'Mountain' Q 'Fire' 
According to Jagadiga, both of  these cognitive states are valid and acceptable. 
Such is not the case with the cognition of sentence-meaning. In the cognized 
sentence-meaning, the relation between the word-meanings is a fixed relation, and 
no inversions are valid. An objector may argue that all cognitions should have 
the structure 'x + y ' ,  and hence the sentence-meaning should also have the same 
structure, a9 Jagadgga says that such a simplified structure cannot be accepted as 
representing all kinds of cognition. One has to accept the existence of  qualificative 
cognition. The inferential cognition and the cognition of sentence-meaning are 
always qualificative cognitions. 4~ 
18. 
Jagadi'~a says that the view that sentence-meaning is always of the nature of a 
qualificative cognition, and can only be generated by words with mutual expectancy 
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etc. is based on the analytical foundations of anvaya 'concurrent occurrence' and 
vyatireka 'concurrent non-occurrence'. 41 If the members of a word-group do not 
have mutual expectancy etc., then in that case, one does not find the resulting 
sentence-meaning of a qualificative nature. On the other hand, wherever such 
qualificative sentence-meaning is found, one also finds that the words generating 
that qualificative sentence-meaning indeed have the properties of mutual expec- 
tancy etc. The method ofanvaya-vyatireka is often used in the Ny~ya texts in 
connection with the two types of concommitance used in inference. The anvaya- 
concommitance is of the form P ~ Q, while the vyatireka-concommitance is of the 
form ~ Q  3 ~ P. But here Jagadfga uses the terms anvaya and vyatireka to refer 
to the patterns of  observation, and in this context, anvaya 'concurrent occurrence' 
is of the form 'P 3 Q', and vyatireka 'concurrent non-occurrence' is of the form 
'~P  D ~Q'.  IfPstands for words with mutual expectancy etc. and Q for the 
integrated sentence-meaning, we can substantiate the truth of 'P ~ Q' and ' ~ P  3 ~ Q' 
by observation of  sentential and non-sentential word-groups. 
19. 
Can the cognition of  sentence-meaning be viewed as an instance of memory? 
Memory (smrti) of an object x is preceded by a mental impression (sa~nsk~ra) ofx.  
This mental impression o f x  is itself produced by a direct experience ofx .  42 Thus 
the process of memory may be represented as: 
Direct Mental [ Awakening I ~ 
Experience =~ Impression ~ of the =~ 
of x of x Impression 
Only a mental impression o f x  can cause memory ofx .  A mental impression o f x  
cannot cause memory ofy .  
Jagad~ga says that the cognition of sentence-meaning cannot be regarded as an 
instance of memory, since it is not always found to be preceded by mental 
impressions of  identical form. 43 This is an interesting argument. If a listener under- 
stands a given sentence S at a given time, then this meaning-cognition would 
generate a mental impression of the meaning of S. This impression would help 
understand the sentence S at a later occasion. However, this process cannot explain 
why the sentence S was understood in the first instance. One cannot always say 
that he understands a given sentence, because he has previously understood the 
same sentence. This is not a satisfactory alternative. 
20. 
JagadF~a presents some further arguments to reject inclusion of the cognition of 
sentence-meaning under mental perception. 44 In a mental perception, says Jagadfga 
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anything that is presented to the mind by a previous cognition can become a cog- 
nitum. That is not the ease with the cognition of sentence-meaning. Only those 
meanings which are presented by words with mutual expectancy etc. and those 
which are provided by the relational seam become constituents of  sentence-meaning, as 
I f  one insists on considering the cognition of  sentence-meaning to be a mental 
perception, then along with the meanings provided by words with mutual expec- 
tancy etc., other dements which are brought to the mind at that time through the 
awakening of any previous cognitions would also form part of  the sentence-meaning. 
If  such extraneous elements become constituents of a sentence-meaning, this is not 
desirable. 
How can one prove that such extraneous elements indeed never become con- 
stituents of the sentence-meaning? Jagadfga takes recourse to the standard means 
of conrLrming the nature of  any cognition. This is the 'reflective cognition' 
(anuvyavas~ya). After a cognition of an object, sometimes there is a reflective 
cognition about the previous cognition of  that object. After the cognition 'This is 
a jar', there can be a reflective cognition of the form: 'I know that this is a jar' or 
rather: ' I  know that I know that this is a jar'. The reflective cognition with the 
structure 'I  know that I k n o w . . . '  is a means of judging the structure of the first 
cognition. Jagadf~a argues that the reflective cognitions of  the cognition of 
sentence-meaning indicate clearly that elements not provided by words or the 
relational seam cannot become constituents of  sentence-meaning. 46 
21. 
An objector, as presented by Jagad fga, insists that the cognition of sentence-meaning 
is a mental perception, but he attempts to reformulate his position in such a 
way that he thinks he can avoid the problems mentioned above. What follows is the 
reformulated argument of  the objector: 47 
The reflective cognition of the cognition of sentence-meaning, with the meanings x, y and z, 
can be generated only by the cognition of sentence-meaning, with the meanings x, y and z, and 
which is itself produced by the words which have their ('God-given') signification function to 
represent the meanings x, y and z. 
The implication of this strange reformulation is that if in a specific case, some 
meanings are cognized through the words of  the sentence, and some others are 
brought to the mind through certain previous cognitions being awakened, then 
there would in fact be two distinct mental perceptions. One mental perception 
would be comprised of the meaning-elements signified by the words and provided 
by the relational seam. The other mental impression would consist of the extraneous 
elements brought to the mind. This is the reformulated theory of the cognition of 
sentence-meaning as a mental perception. 
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This obviously involves undesirable prolixity. Under normal circumstances, a 
mental perception can include everything that is presented to the mind by whatever 
previous cognitions at a given moment. But the above formulation imposes 
restrictions on the mental perception of sentence-meaning. Thus the mental perception 
of sentence meaning does not remain a normal mental perception, but becomes a very 
special kind of it, such that the normal epistemic conditions of a mental perception do 
not apply to it. Then, asks Jagadfga, why call it a mental perception? 48 
22. 
There is a more serious objection to the above-mentioned reformulation. According 
to Jagadf~a, the sentence-meaning does occasionally include some elements which 
are neither presented by the words nor by the relational seam. For example, the 
sentence ghat.ena ialam anaya 'Bring water in a jar' means something in addition 
to the meanings signified by the words or by the relational seam. Obviously one 
cannot bring water in a jar which is broken or which has holes in it. If the sentence 
has to correspond to the intention of the speaker, then from the class of jars, one 
must exclude those jars which have holes in them. Thus, according to Jagadi'~a, the 
sentence 'Bring water in a jar' itself comes to mean: 'Bring water in a jar without 
holes'. 49 According to Jagadf~a's own judgement, the reflective cognition of the 
cognition of the meaning of this sentence cont~n'rns the inclusion of 'without holes' 
in the sentence-meaning. If one adheres to the previously stated reformulated view 
that the cognition of sentence-meaning is a mental perception, then one cannot 
explain how the meaning 'without holes' forms part of the sentence-meaning. It 
must be noted that there is no agreement among Indian philosophers on inclusion 
of such elements in the sentence-meaning. 
23. 
Jagad~a rejects inclusion of the cognition of  sentence-meaning into inference from 
a different point of view. In an inferential cognition, only that element (i.e. the 
major term) which is previously known as being invariably concommitant with the 
middle term occurring in the minor term can appear as the cognitum, s~ If the 
cognition of sentence-meaning is included in the inferential process, then only those 
elements which are pre-cognized (p~rva-param.rs.t.a) in the above-mentioned way 
would become cognita of the sentential meaning-cognition. However, this is an 
unrealistic restriction and is contrary to one's experience. 
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24. 
One may prefer to think that the memory of  the meaning-elements generated by 
words with mutual expectancy etc. is the cause o f  the cognition o f  sentence- 
meaning. In this veiw again there can be two alternatives. Though the cause o f  the 
resulting sentential cognition is supposed to be memory of  the individual meaning- 
elements, yet the finally resulting cognition o f  sentence-meaning may be supposed 
to be either a mental perception or an inferential cognition. 
This formulation has been rejected by Jagadf~a, since in both the alternatives it 
creates difficulties. These difficulties have already been pointed out in the previous 
discussions.S 1 
25. 
The purpose o f  this paper has been to point out some o f  the aspects o f  the Ny[ya 
conception o f  a vakya 'sentence', drawing attention to those epistemological 
arguments o f  Jagadiga Bhat.t.[c~rya which have so far received little attention. Other 
arguments of  Jagadi-s rejecting inclusion of  verbal cognition into inference by 
Vai[es.ikas and Buddhists have been discussed at some length by S. C. Chatterjee. s2 
Though the particulars o f  the arguments o f  Jagad~a may appear somewhat old- 
fashioned to a modern philosopher, the general direction o f  the arguments is quite 
stimulating. The issues raised by Jagad~a concerning the structure o f  the various 
modes o f  cognition and the structure o f  the linguistic cognition in particular are 
quite significant, and these models should prove to be o f  interest to modern students 
of  the cognitive aspects o f  linguistic communication. 
Dept  o f  Linguistics, University o f  Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
NOTES 
t The term ~abda 'word, linguistic unit' is elastic enough to range from individual sounds to 
sentential sequences and from pronounced words to the communicative aspects of language. 
The term ddbda-bodha normally refers to sentential meaning-cognition and this cognition is 
represented by different schools of Indian philosophy with different technical paraphrases. 
These technical paraphrases axe held as representing the structure of the meaning-cognition. 
2 eka-tih vitkyam, V~rttika by Kfityfiyana on P(fi.nini) 2.1.1. For discussions on this v~rttika, 
see: Matilal (1966), pp. 377-8 and Joshi (1968), pp. 108 ft. also Devasthali (1974). 
3 This is a traditional extension of the definition to include complex sentences with a main 
clause and other subordinate clauses. 
4 V~rttika on P.2.1.1. Also see: Joshi (1968), p. 105. 
5 apara aha / ~khy~tada sa-vi~e.sa.nam it), eva / sarv~ni hy etimi kriy~-viw Vol. I, 
Sec. I, p. 337. (MB on P.2.1.1.) Also: Joshi (1968), p. 108 and Devasthali (1974). 
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V~kya-padiya II, 1-2. 
7 V~kya-pad[ya II. 7: "Just as a partless single cognition of (a mosaic of) all (different parts) 
is analysed (consequently) in accordance with the difference in the perceived (parts), so is a 
cognition of sentence-meaning (only subsequently analysed)." 
II. 8-9:  "Just as a single homogeneous picture is described (subsequently) in terms of differen- 
tiating (features) such as the blue color which ate of distinctive characteristics, similarly a 
sentence which is a single entity complete in all respects is subsequently described in terms of 
mutually expectant words which are ('in fact') different from (the indivisible sentence)." 
II. 10: "Just as in a given inflected word, the stem, the affix etc. are isolated (subsequently 
through linguistic analysis), similar is the analytical extraction of individual words in a given 
sentence." 
II. 13: "The (sentential) linguistic unit has no ('real') division; then how can there be such 
divisions in the (sentence-) meaning? An ignorant person comes to comprehend different 
derivational processes through (these 'unreal') analytical distinctions." 
If. 38: "Grammarians say that the (descriptive) means are such that they have to be (provisionally) 
adopted and eventually given up (once the real nature of language is 'internalized'), and there 
is no inherent compulsion in adopting different (descriptive) devices." 
a Vakya-padTya II. 22-29. 
9 The complete statement of the definition is as follows: arthaikatv~d ekafn v~kyam, 
s~k~hksaPh ced vibh~ge sy~d, Jaimini-sf4tra (2.1.46). This has also been stated by Bhart.thari in 
V~kyapad[ya (IL3). So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, they form a 
single sentence, but only if any one of these words, on being disjoined from the rest, becomes 
'wanting'. Ganganath Jha has the following observations: "There is a difference among the 
Bhfit.tas themselves regarding the exact meaning of the term 'artha' in the compound 'arthaikatv~t' 
in the s~tra. P~rthasfitathi Mishra takes it in the sense of purpose, according to which all the 
words, phrases and clauses that serve a single purpose - of indicating details connected with an 
act for instance, - are to be treated as 'one sentence'. Someshvara Bhatta in the Ny~yasudh~, 
on the other hand, takes the word 'artha' in the sense of idea; so that any group of words that 
expresses one complete idea or judgement is to be treated as 'one sentence'. The difference in 
reality comes to this that while, by the former view, the definition of 'one sentence' is applicable 
to Vedic sentences only, - by the latter, it becomes applicable to all kinds of sentences, Vedic 
as well as secular.", Jha (1933), I, p. 215. Also see: Devasthali (1959), pp. 190 ft. 
,0 Jagadi~a says: na v~ ghat.ah pacat[ty etayoh, pratyekafn na v~kyam, SSP, p. 66. Translation: 
"It is not the case that the expressions ghatah, and pacati are individually not sentences." Also 
see: Matilal (1966), p. 379. 
,1 Saktarh pad.am /asmizt pad~d ayam artho boddhavya it~varecch~-safnketah. ~aktih. /, TS, 
p. 66; ~dhunika-safnketite tuna ~aktir its" safnprad~yah / navy,s tu i~varecch~ na ~aktih kintv 
icchaiva / ten~dhunika-safnketite'pi ~aktir asty every ~huh. / , KM, p. 549. The older tradition 
believes that the semantic function of a word is God's desire that a certain word should express 
a certain thing, and therefore, words which are only recently introduced into the usage do not 
possess a 'legal' semantic function. The neo-logicians believe that semantic function of words 
is based on the desire of the community, so to say, and not on the desire of God. 
,2 ~aktarh padam, TS, p. 66; KM, p. 581; Matilal (1966), p. 379, says: "An 'atomic' pada, 
according to them, is the smallest meaning-bearing phoneme sequence . . . .  According to this 
theory, even an affix or suffix should be called a pada or word, provided one can assign some 
significance to it." 
,3 te vibhakty.anthh padam, Ny~ya-sfitra (2.2.58). The Ny~yabha.sya of Vfitsyfyana says: 
varn.~h, vibhakty-ant~, pada-safa/~h, bhavanti / vibhaktir dvay[ n~miky ~khy~tik~ ca / 'br~hmanah. ' 
'pacati' ity ud~hara.nam / 'upasarga-nip~t~s tarhi na pada-safnl~h. /lak.san.~ntararh v~cyam' iti / 
w ca khalu n~miky~ vibhakter avyay~l lopas tayoh pada-safnf~7~rtham iti / , on the NyT~ya- 
s~tra (2.2.58). Translation: "The sound-sequences ending with terminal affixes are called padas. 
The terminal affixes are twofold: case-endings and verbal endings. The examples are br~hman, ah. 
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andpacati. (Objection:) If that is the case, then the indeclinables and prepositions cannot be 
called padas, and hence a new definition should be given. (Reply:) The deletion of case-endings 
after indecllnables is prescribed (by the grammarians) in order to obtain the designation pada 
for them." The Ny~ya-bh~sya (on NS 2.2.58) further states: paden~rtha-sampratyaya iti 
prayo/anam, "The purpose (of giving the definition ofpada 'an inflected word') is (to indicate) 
that meaning is signified by an inflected word (pada)." This is a very significant statement. In 
the history of the Nyaya system, the word pada has shifted from 'inflected word' to 'morphemic 
item'. Matilal (1966, p. 379) says that this is ~/shift from a 'formal' definition to a 'semantic' 
definition. This is quite justifiable. However, a comparison of the Ny~ya-bh~s.ya statement 
quoted above with later texts indicates perhaps a shift within semantic assumptions. Vatsyayana 
seems to say that only apada 'an inflected item' is capable of signifying meaning, while in later 
times we find that even morphemic items are held as having a capacity of signifying meaning. 
This shift is quite interesting. K~tyfiyana's v~rttikas on P. 1.2.45 indicate the same problem. On 
the one hand, K.:~tyfiyana raises an objection to Pfin.ini's characterization of a nominal stem as 
being meaningful. He says that a stem cannot be meaningful, since a stem alone is never used in 
the real usage (arthavatt~ nopapadyate, kevalen~vacan~t). Thus, from this communicative point 
of view, only inflected words can convey meaning. However, this objection is answered by 
saying that meaningfulness of stems and affixes is established through logical analysis of inflected 
words (siddhain tv anvaya.vyatirek~bhy~m). Thus, stems and affixes do have 'abstracted' 
meanings. Here we are actually talking about two different levels of meaningfulness. The shift 
in the Ny~ya system can, then, be explained as a shift from one semantic level to another 
semantic level. For a discussion of these concepts, see: Deshpande (1972), pp. 11 ff. 
14 sup-tii~-antam padam, P. 1.4.14. For a detailed discussion of the P~ninian concepts, see 
Deshpande (1972), pp. 18-24. 
~s vitkyafn tv ~k~hks~-yogyat~-sannidhimat~m pad~nitfn samfihah, Tarkabhits.~, p. 16. Whether 
these three conditions should or should not be included in the definition of a 'sentence' has 
been a matter of controversy. Do they define a 'sentence' or a 'valid sentence' (pram~nafn 
v~kyam)? Matilal (1966, p. 382) touches upon this point. This is a semantic dispute. If we use 
the word 'sentence' in a loose sense, then these three conditions define a 'valid sentence', but 
if the word 'sentence' is strictly used in the sense of 'valid sentence', then these three conditions 
define a 'sentence'. While Annambhatta says that a sentence is a collection of words, and that 
a valid sentence is a collection of words which satisfies the three conditions; Ke~avami~ra says 
that a group of words satisfying the three conditions is a sentence, and that a group of words 
which does not satisfy these conditions is no sentence at all. (TS, pp. 65 if; Tarkabh~s~, p. 16). 
Instances of the loose usage of the word v~kya 'sentence' are found even in Patafijali's Mah~tb- 
h~s.ya (I, Sect. I, p. 105). Patafijali speaks of meaningful and meaningless sentences (loke hy 
arthavanti c~narthak~ni ca fftky~ni dr.~yante). 
16 Systems differ on whether the meaning of the stem is dominant (prak.rty-artha-pr~dh~nya), 
or whether the affix-meaning is dominant (pratyay~rtha-prT~dh~nya). If x is affix-meaning and 
y is stem-meaning, then according to the first view, the meaning structure isyQx, while 
according to the second view, it is xQv. The Neo-logicians believe that the stem-meaning is 
dominant. 
1~ padasya pad~ntara-vyatireka-prayukt~nvay~manu-bh~vakatvam itk~hks.Tz, TS, p. 67. For 
details on the dispute whether mutual expectancy helps sentential meaning-cognition simply 
by its existence or only if it is known prior to the meaning-cognition, see: Matilal (1966), p. 383. 
t8 kecit tu-vibhakti-vi~es.avat-pada-samabhivy~hhra ev~k~hksfi, Mani-darpana, p. 15. 
19 sam~sa-sthale ca ghat~di-pad~vyavahita-pftrva~varti-n[l~di-padatvam, nHitdi-pad~vyavahitottara- 
vartbghat.~di-padatvafn vii ~k~hks.~, Vyutpattbv?tda, p. 34. Gad~dhara who considers a particular 
ordered sequence of elements to be representing the structural mutual expectancy in a compound 
is aware that in an inflected language like Sanskrit the ordered sequence of words is not necessary 
in a sentence. The order is quite flexible. Thus he talks only of samabhivyZ, hT~ra 'co-occurrence' 
of words as representing the mutual expectancy in the case of uncompounded usages like nilo 
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ghat.~ 'a blue jar'. See: Vyutpattiv~da, pp. 33-34:  pratham6-vibhakty-anta-ghatddi-pada-sama- 
bhivy~hrta-pratham~nta-n[l~di-padatvam eva asamasta-n[la-ghata-pad~dy-~k~hk~, "The mutual 
expectancy in the case of uncompounded sequences such as n[lah, ghatah. 'a blue jar' can be 
explained as the property of having the word ghata with a nominative ending co-occur with the 
word n[la with a nominative ending." 
2o gav~d~v astitv~der anvaya-bodhdnuk~ldnup~rv~-paryavasit6 tv ~k~hks.~, SSP, p. 3. 
~a S. D. Joshi (1968), p. 87, fn. 144. 
as k~ punah. ~abdayor vyapeks~ ? na br~mah. ~abdayor iti / k#h tarhi ? arthayor iti /, MB, I, 
Sect. II, p. 332 (MB on P.2.1.1). Kunjunni Raja (1963, p. 155, fn. 3) observes: "Strictly speaking 
s~marthya is the capacity of the words for mutual association, vyapeks.~ is their interdependence, 
and ~k~hk.~ is the need one has for the other for completing the sense." In a way vyapeks6 and 
~k~hks~ represent different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
23 PLM, pp. 77 ff. 
24 MB (on P.2.1.1), I, Sect. II, p. 338: yukta-yukte nady6s tis.thati k6le / vrks.asya lambate 
w / ~aHr~m te odanam dad~mi /~Hn~m me odanavh dad~si / kith punah, k~ran, am (samartha- 
nigh~to) na sidhyati? asarnarthatv~t /, "Examples for indirectly connected words: nady~s ti~hati 
kfde: '(He) stands on the bank of the river'; vrks.asya lambate gakh~y~m: '(It) hangs on the branch 
of the tree'; ~l[n~th te odanath dad~mi: 'Of grains I give you rice'; w me odanavh dad6si: 
'Of grains you give me rice'. What is the reason that (the rule for loss of accent, i.e.P.8.1.28, 
etc. conditioned by the semantic relation of the two consecutive words) does not apply in 
these examples (for the initial words of each sentence)? Because (the words involved) are 
not semantically connected." The last two examples are not for the loss of accent but for the 
forms te and me for the regular tubhyam and mahyam. P.8.1.28 says that a verb preceded by 
a non-verb loses its accent. If this rule is conditioned by the semantic relationship of the verb 
and the non-verb, then the rule will not apply to the first two examples. Similarly, tubhyam 
and mahyam can be substituted by te and me, if preceded by another word. Here, if the same 
condition applies, the rule will not apply to the last two examples. 
~s Kfityfiyana suggests that the problems pointed out in the fn. 24 can be remedied by not 
having the condition 'semantically related words', but by having the condition restated as: 
'within the same sentence'. With this restated condition, the loss of accent does apply to the 
verb tis.thati in nady~s tisthati kfde 'he stands on the bank of the river', despite the fact that 
nady~s and tist.hati are not semantically related. They, however, occur in the same sentence 
(v~kya). See: v~rttika: sam~na-v~kye nigh~ta-yusmad- asmad-~de~h vaktavyhh., on P.2.1.1. 
~ eka-pad~rthe'para-pad~rtha-sambandho yogyata / ta]-]~n6bh~v~c ca vahnin~ sihcat~ty-~dau 
na ~bda-bodhah., KM, p. 632; arth~b~dho yogyat~, TS, p. 67. Vi~vanfitha and Annambhat.ta 
emphasize the positive and the negative aspects ofyogyat~ YogyatT~ indicates that two word- 
meanings, or rather referents, must be compatible with each other, so that they can be naturally 
related to each other. 
2~ ata eva vahnin~ sihcat[ti v~kyam ayogyam / vahneh, sek~nvaya-prayo]aka-drava-dravyatv~- 
bh~v~t / et~dr~a-sthalesu n~nvaya-bodhah, kin tu pratyekam pad~lrtha-m~ztram iti naiy~yikhh. / 
tan na /  bauddhT~rthasyaiva sarvatra buddhi-vi.sayatvena b~dhasy~sambhavT~t / harir apy bha- 
'atyantd-saty api hy arthe ]~nath ~abdah. karoti ca' iti /a to  vandhyh.sut~di-~abd~n~m pr~ti- 
padikatvam/, PLM, pp. 81-82.  It is important to note that while the Naiyfiyikas consider 
word-meaning to be the referred thing, or the referred items from their realistic ontology, 
N.~ge~a argues that words immediately correspond to conceptual structures which may or may 
not directly correspond to structures in one's ontology. Thus N~ge~a insists on distinguishing 
two levels of artha 'meaning', i.e. conceptual or notional and ontological What is directly 
relevant to the process of linguistic communication is the conceptual structure of semantic 
ontology, than the structure of 'external' ontology. N~igega presents some very interesting 
arguments in his Laghumahj~.sa (pp. 203 ft.). If the word ghata 'jar' were to convey external 
reality of a jar, then a sentence such as ghatah ash 'there is a jar' must involve a redundant verb. 
A sentence such as 'a jar does not exist' would almost be impossible, because non-existence 
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conveyed by the negative verb would necessarily contradict the inherent existence conveyed 
by the word 'jar'. In Nige~a's view, the verbs 'exists' and 'does not exist' in the sentences 'a jar  
exists' and ' a ja r  does not  exist' are used to convey external existence and non-existence of the 
jar which always has a conceptual existence conveyed by the word 'jar'. Thus, for Nige~a, 
neither the words 'a horn of a rabit '  nor the sentence 'a horn of a rabit does not exist' are 
meaningless. For him, the sentence 'a horn of a rabit does not  exist' means that the horn of 
a rabbit which does have a conceptual existence does not  have any external existence. N~ge~a's 
view is a middle path between the extreme idealism of the Buddhist logicians for whom words 
correspond only to conceptual structures and there are no "real" ontological structures, and the 
extreme realism of the Val~e.sikas for whom words directly stand for the outside objects. 
=s Noam Chomsky (1964), p. 385, fn. 5. 
29 It is important to note how the scope of 'grammar'  has shifted. While the Sanskrit grammarians 
would consider the sentence 'an apple eats John'  to be grammatically acceptable, though 
empirically unacceptable, modern linguistic theories try to extend the notion of 'grarnmar' in 
such a way that an 'ideal grammar' will not generate such sentences. In ancient India, these 
two different aspects of the sentence 'an apple eats John'  would be handled by two different 
departments. While grammarians would limit themselves to the validity of the structure, 
logicians would take responsibility of judging the logical and empirical validity. 
so The word sarhsarga stands for 'relation, connection, contact', and rnary~d~ means 'boundary'.  
Thus, sainsarga-mary~d~ refers to the point of contact or a relational seam between the two 
words. It is something like a feeling of inter-relatedness created by the juxtaposition of words. 
31 pad~d anupasthitasya sainsargatay~ bhbnam iti niyamah. , PD, p. 28. 
32 ~bda-bodhe caikapad~rthe'para-pad~rthasya sathsarga.h sainsarga-maryaday~ bh~sate, Vyut. 
pattiv~da, p. 1. 
33 ~k~ks.a-prayo]ya-safnsargatvam, Prak~a on Vyutpatti-v~da, p. 2. 
34 w eka-padT~rth~nuyogik~para-pad~rtha-pratiyogika-sainsarga-bh~sik~ samabhivy~- 
h~ra-rf~p~ ~k~hks~ eva, Jay~ on Vyutpatti-v~da, p. 2. 
3s Quoted by O. Hobart Mowrer in 'The Psychologist Looks At Language', Readings in the 
Psychology o f  Language, ed. by L. A. Jakobovits and Miron, Prentice-Hali, New Jersey, 1967, 
p. 13, fn. 17. 
36 upanIta-bh~nam-laukik~aukik~bh.aya-sannikar.sa-]anyain f~nam / yath~ surabhi candanam 
ity-~dau pratyak.sam upan[ta-bh~nam bhavati / tac ca saurabhy~in~e alaukika-sannikar.sa~. 
candanain~e laukika-sannikar.sa~ caitad ubh~bhy~in /anyata iti bodhyam, ArK, p. 163. 
37 $SP, pp. 6 -7 .  
38 na tu padT~rthT, n~m upasthiti-m~tram, $SP, p. 7. 
39 na tu pad~rth~n~m upasthiti-m~tram, viw 7mubhavikatvT~d, anyath~numiter apy 
apaldpdpatteh. , SSP, pp. 7 -8 .  
~o Ibid. 
~ For details, see: Cardona (1967-68),  and Deshpande (1972), pp. 11-17  ('Logical Basis of 
Semantic Analysis'). 
~2 anubhava-]anyd smrti-hetur bh~van~, T$, pp. 72-73 .  Bh~van~ is the kind of sainsk~ra which 
is involved in the production of smrti 'memory'. A more technical formulation of the relation- 
ship between anubhava 'direct experience', sathsk~ra 'mental impression' and sm.rti 'memory' is 
given by the commentary NRakantha-prak~ik~: tat-tad-vi.sayaka-sm.rtiin prati tat-tad-vis.ayaka- 
sainsk~rain prati ca tat-tad-vi.sayak~nubhavatvenaiva hetut~t, TS, p. 381. This very concept is 
expressed by Jagadi~a by his expression sam~n~k~ra-sainsk~ra, $SP, p. 8. 
~3 na c~sau smrtih., sarn~n~k~ra-sainsk~r~prabhavatv~t, SSP, p. 8. 
~" Ibi~ 
4s n~pi s~k.~t-k~rah., s~k~i~ks.a.padenaiva prak~r~ntaren.~py upasthit~rthasya upanaya-mary~- 
day~vag~hit~patteh., $SP, p. 8. 
~6 na cest.7,pattir anubhava-virodh~t, tad-uttaram tath~vidh~muvyavas~y~pattew ca, SSP, p. 8. 
J. N. Mohanty (1966), p. 91, uses the symbol K~ to stand for the anuvyavas~ya ofK~, ifK~ is 
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the knowledge which apprehends K1, where K1 is a direct cognition. He renders the term 
anuvyavas~ya by 'introspective awareness'. 
47 tat.tad-artha-vi.sayaka.~bda-mater anuvyava~yavh prati tat.tad-artha-s~k~hk.sa-pada./anya. 
tad.gocara-~bdatvena vi.saya-vidhay~ hetutva-kalpan?zy?tm ati-gaurav~t, SSP, p. 8. 
,s Ibid. 
49 itara.b~dha-labdhasya chidretaratv&ter apaddrthasy@i avagdhitvena ~a'bda-mater anuvyavas?- 
yarn~natv~t, SSP, p. 8. This whole argument fits in the tradition of the old school of Nyw 
which accepts t~tparya 'speaker's intention' as one of the important aids in understanding 
the sentence-meaning, The K~rik~vali holds the same view. Perhaps, Jagadi~a was not sure of 
its validity himself, and hence gave additional arguments. The two commentaries on the SSP, 
Krs..nak~nti and R~mabhadr[ refer to this view as belonging to the old school and doubt its 
validity (SSP, p. 9.). 
so SSP, p. 9. 
s~ SSP, pp. 9-10. 
sa S.C. Chatterjee (1939), pp. 349 ff. 
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